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Abstract—Secure communication in the Multi-user and Multi-
eavesdropper (MUME) scenario is considered in this paper.
It has be shown that secrecy can be improved when the
transmitter simultaneously transmits information-bearing signal
to the intended receivers and artificial noise to confuse the
eavesdroppers. Several processing schemes have been proposed
to limit the co-channel interference (CCI). In this paper, we
propose the increasing security degree of freedom (ISDF) method,
which takes idea from the dirty-paper coding (DPC) and ZF
beam-forming. By means of known interference pre-cancelation
at the transmitter, we design each precoder according to the
previously designed precoding matrices, rather than other users’
channels, which in return provides extra freedom for the design
of precoders. Simulations demonstrate that the proposed method
achieves the better performance and relatively low complexity.
Index Terms—MUME-MIMO, Block Diagonalization, ZF
beam-forming, ISDF, Secrecy Capacity,
I. INTRODUCTION
THE growing interest in security at the physical layerof wireless communications has sparked a resurgence
of research in secure communication. In the early works on
information theoretic security, Wyner introduces the wiretap
channel model, in which the eavesdropper’s channel is defined
to be a degraded version of the legitimate receiver’s channel
[1]. It is shown that a non-zero secrecy capacity can be
obtained only if the eavesdropper’s channel is of lower quality
than that of the intended recipient. Csisza´r and Ko¨rner extend
this problem to a general non-degraded channel condition in
which a common message is transmitted to the two receivers
and the confidential message to only one of them [2]. Another
main assumption in the aforementioned works is that the
eavesdropper’s channel is known at the transmitter [3], [4], and
then the generalized singular value decomposition (GSVD) 1
method can be used to transmit the signal to the null space
of the channel from transmitter to eavesdropper. Clearly, these
assumptions are usually impractical and unreasonable, partic-
ularly for passive eavesdroppers. In this paper, we overcome
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1The generalized singular value decomposition (GSVD) of an m × n
matrix A and a p × n matrix B is given by the pair of factorizations
A = U
∑
1
[0,R]QT and B = V
∑
2
[0,R]QT , where U, V and Q are
orthogonal matrices, R is an r × r upper triangular nonsingular matrix,
∑
1
and
∑
2
are nonnegative diagonal matrice satisfying
∑
T
1
∑
1
+
∑
T
2
∑
2
=
I.
this problem and propose a scheme without using any CSI of
eavesdroppers.
In order to achieve secure communication, even when the
receiver’s channel is worse than the eavesdropper’s channel,
or the absence of eavesdroppers’ channel state information
(CSI), various physical-layer techniques have been proposed.
One of the most common techniques is the use of cooperative
interference or artificial noise to confuse the eavesdropper. The
cooperative interference method can be divided into two cat-
egories: (i) the trust-friend model, in which two base stations
connected by a high-capacity backbone such as optical fiber,
and one base station can continuously transmit an interfering
signal to secure the uplink communication for the other base
station [5], [6]; (ii) the helper-relay model, where the secrecy
level can be increased by having the cooperative interferer
[7] or relay [8] to send codewords independent to the source
message, which can be canceled at the intended receiver.
Another major techniques for secure communication is the
use of multiple antennas. When multiple antennas are equipped
at the transmitter, it is possible for the transmitter to simultane-
ously transmit both the information-bearing signal and artifi-
cial noise to achieve secrecy in a fading environment [9]-[11],
which may replace the role of the cooperative interference
method in [5]-[8]. In the design of secure communication
with artificial noise, the transmit power allocation between
the information signal and the artificial noise is an important
issue, which has not been discussed in [9], [10], [11]. A
suboptimal power allocation strategy is considered in [12],
which aims to meet an ideal signal-to-interference-and-noise
ratio (SINR) at the intended receiver to satisfy a quality of
service requirement. The secure communication with artificial
noise is also discussed in [11], in which the closed-form
expression of achievable rate and the optimal power allocation
has been obtained, however only single-receiver and single-
antenna at receiver was considered.
Most of the previous papers focus on the single-user sys-
tems. However most practical communication systems have
more than one user and the eavesdroppers may not appear
alone as well, and they may choose to cooperate or not [11].
In addition, each terminal may be equipped with multiple
antennas, which is representative, for example, of downlink
transmission in LTE systems and wireless local area networks.
This is the so called Multi-User and Multi-Eve (MUME)
MIMO systems, which have been seldom investigated before.
In this paper, we will focus on investigating the MUME
systems.
It’s also worth noting that the achievable secrecy rate of
MUME systems is different from that of single-user and
single-antenna systems studied before, which must make sure
2that any legitimate user will not be wiretapped by any eaves-
dropper. The authors in [13] put forward an MUME model in
which all other users are viewed as potential eavesdroppers by
the targeted user. They also give a definition of the achievable
secrecy rate of multiuser wiretap model in terms of secrecy
sum rate. The authors in [14] give another definition of achiev-
able secrecy rate in Gaussian MIMO multi-receiver Wiretap
channel, which is named secrecy capacity region. Besides, the
authors in [15], [16] considers the compound wire-tap channel,
which is based on the classical wire-tap channel with channel
from the source to the destination and the channel from the
source to the wiretapper taking a number of states respectively.
It can be viewed as the multicast wire-tap channel with
multiple destinations and multiple wire-tappers with the same
massage transmitted to different destinations, which is slightly
different from the broadcast wire-tap channels in this paper.
They also give another significant definition of the achievable
secrecy rate in terms of absolute secrecy rate, which idea
is to take the security of the poorest-performance receive-
wiretap pair into consideration. If the poorest-performance
pair can meet the quality of service requirement, then all
other pairs can do. Therefore this definition of achievable
secrecy rate may be more reasonable and constructive in the
practical secure communication systems. The authors in [16],
[17] discussed the realization of the achievable secrecy rate
of multiple users (multiple eavesdroppers) with artificial noise
separately, in which, however, the system model is compound
wiretap channel but broadcast MUME wiretap channel [18].
Since the transmitter needs to transmit different message
to different receivers in the broadcast MUME wiretap model,
there must be considerable co-channel interference (CCI) in
the system. In order to limit the CCI from the signals transmit-
ted to other users and mask receivers’ own message signal si-
multaneously, two practical linear transmission schemes were
often used in the early works: (i) the SVD method discussed
in [9], [11], which conducts an SVD decomposition on each
user’s channel matrix to get a maximum channel gain for
their own message but can not suppress the interference from
other user’s message; (ii) the ZF beamforming method [19]
and its promotion—-the BD method [20], [21], in which all
the information is transmitted in the null space of all other
receivers’ channels. The SVD method and ZF beamforming
method are simple, but of little ideal performance. While
the BD method is of somewhat ideal performance but more
complicated than the formers.
In view of the drawbacks of the previous schemes, we
propose an alternative approach, which takes idea from dirty-
paper coding (DPC) [22], [23] and ZF beam-forming [19]. It
can directly increase the degree of freedom when designing
the transmission precoders, which in return make obvious
improvement not only at the achievable secrecy rate, but
also at the antenna constraints at transmitter compared with
the BD method. What’s more, in our proposed scheme, we
choose to map the artificial noise into the null space of
co-precoder matrix instead of the null space of legitimate
receivers’ channels in the existing schemes, which may offer
extra improvement on the secrecy rate in the low SNR region.
The performance will be further improved when the water-
Fig. 1: The MUME-MIMO wiretap system model.
filling (WF) method is used. Besides, the power allocation
between the information signal and the artificial noise are also
discussed.
In this paper, (·)
H
and tr(·) denote the Hermitian transpose
and trace of a matrix. E(·) denotes expectation, and I denotes
an identity matrix. I(·, ·) denotes mutual information. [x]+ =
max{0, x}.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
In this paper, we consider the broadcast MUME wiretap
model as shown in Fig. 1, in which there is one transmitter
named Alice, J legitimate users named Bobs and K passive
eavesdroppers named Eves. Alice tries to send independent
messages to all the legitimate receivers while keeping each
of the eavesdropper ignorant of all the messages. All of the
terminals are equipped with multiple antennas. NBj antennas
are equipped at the j-th Bob, NEk antennas at the k-th
Eve, and NA antennas at the single Alice. This scenario is
representative, for example, of downlink transmission in the
LTE systems and wireless local area networks.
Let the transmit signal X =
∑J
j=1 Uj + V, where Uj is
the information bearing signal vector for user j, and V is the
artificial noise signal vector to interference Eves. Then the
received signals at Bobs and Eves are respectively:
Bob j : Yj = HjX+N
B
j , for j = 1, ..., J,
Eve k : Zk = GkX+N
E
k , for k = 1, ...,K,
(1)
where Hj is the NBj × NA channel matrix between the
transmitter and Bob j, Gk is the NEk × NA channel matrix
between the transmitter and eavesdropper k, NBj and N
E
k
are respectively the additive white Gaussian noise vectors
observed at the j-th Bob and k-th Eve, which covariance ma-
trices satisfy E[NBj N
B
j
H
] = σ2BjI, and E[N
E
k N
E
k
H
] = σ2EkI
respectively.
We assume that the channel matrix Hj and Gk are
block-fading, whose entries are complex Gaussian variables
with zero-mean and unit-variance. We also assume that per-
fect channel state information (CSI) of the receiver, i.e.,
the channel matrices Hj , j = 1, 2, . . . , J , are avail-
able at Alice, e.g., either through reverse channel estimation
3in time-division-duplex (TDD) or feedback in frequency-
division-duplex (FDD). While the channel matrices Gk, k =
1, 2, . . . ,K , are unavailable at Alice due to the passive nature
of eavesdroppers.
Our objective is to transmit different secret message to the
corresponding Bobs. We try to reduce the CCI from the others,
and make sure that the underlying Eves can not wiretap any
communication between Alice and Bobs. In the following, we
provide lower and upper bounds on the achievable secrecy rate
of the generalized broadcast MUME wire-tap channel.
Let RBj denote the mutual information rate between Alice
and Bob j, and REk denote that between Alice and Eve k for
Bob j. Then
RBj = max[I(Uj ;Yj)], for j = 1, ..., J,
REjk = max[I(Uj ;Zk)], for k = 1, ...,K.
(2)
In the sequel, the achievable secrecy rate of the receive-wiretap
pair (j, k) (for Bob j and Eve k) can be denoted by [24]
Rjk = [R
B
j −R
E
jk]
+
. (3)
The achievable secrecy rate of MUME wiretap model is
usually noted by secrecy sum rate (Rssr) [13] or secrecy
rate region [14]. However, in the practical broadcast MUME
wireless communication systems, the massages transmitted
vary with different users, we should take each user into
consideration, once it is chosen according to some criterion.
Therefore we must make sure that any user’s communication
can not be wiretapped by any eavesdropper. Hence the secrecy
rate of the system is determined neither by the best transmis-
sion pair nor the total rate gap between Bobs and Eves, but by
the poorest-performance transmission pair in reality. Then we
propose an alternative definition of the secrecy rate for MUME
wire-tap channel, which is called absolute secrecy rate (Rasr).
Obviously, the absolute secrecy rate actually is just the lower
bound of the achievable secrecy rate, and can be given by
Rasr = min
j,k
{Rjk} = min
j,k
{[RBj −R
E
jk]
+
} = [min
j
{RBj } −max
k
{REjk}]
+
= [min
j
max
PUj
I(Yj ;Uj)−max
k
max
PUj
I(Zk;Uj))]
+
,
(4)
where PUj is an input distribution. As for the secrecy sum
rate (Rssr), we have
Rssr =
∑
j
min
k
{Rjk} =
∑
j
[RBj −max
k
{REk }]
+
=
∑
j
[max
PUj
I(Yj ;Uj)−max
k
max
PUj
I(Zk;Uj))]
+
.
(5)
III. THE DESIGN OF PRECODERS IN MUME-MIMO
NETWORK BASED ON ISDF
At Alice, the data for each user is processed before trans-
mission. Then it is launched into the MIMO channel with the
random artificial noise. Let Wj be an NA×dj linear precoder,
uj be a dj×1 symbol vector for Bob j, and dj be the number
of parallel data symbols transmitted simultaneously for Bob j
[22] satisfying 1 ≤ dj ≤ NBj . Let V be the artificial noise
signal vector, W be the transmission preprocessing matrix,
and v be the symbol vector. They are both used for the
artificial noise. Then the transmission signal is
X =
J∑
j=1
Uj +V =
J∑
j=1
Wjuj +Wv. (6)
The received signal at Bobs and Eves are respectively
Yj = Hj
J∑
ℓ=1
Wℓuℓ +HjWv+N
B
j , j = 1, . . . , J,
Zk = Gk
J∑
ℓ=1
Wℓuℓ +GkWv +N
E
k , k = 1, . . . ,K.
(7)
The emphasis of this paper is to design the precoders Wℓ
for ℓ = 1, 2, . . . , J and W. In the SVD method all the data
is transmitted in their own channel image space, so that each
Bob can get the maximum channel gain for the correspond-
ing message. Another one is the block diagonalization (BD)
method, in which all the data is transmitted in the null space of
all other Bobs, which is the promotion of the ZF beamforming
method and can reduce the interference from the other users’
message signal. Here, we propose an alternative approach—
-the increasing security degrees of freedom (ISDF) method,
which is based on dirty-paper coding (DPC) [22], [23] and
ZF beam-forming [19]. In this paper, a single data stream is
to be sent to each receiver when dj = 1, ∀j, and multiple data
streams are sent when dj > 1, ∀j. Note that, only a maximum
of NBj streams can be transmitted simultaneously for user j,
else the message will not be decoded. Criterion of judging the
design is whether the secrecy rate is sufficiently good under
the given power constraints, which will be discussed in detail
with the design of precoders in the following part.
In MUME scenarios, several co-channel Bobs with mul-
tiple antennas aim to communicate with Alice in the same
frequency and time slots. In this case, it is necessary to design
transmission scheme that is able to suppress the CCI at Bobs.
In multi-user wireless security communications with artificial
noise, the precoding matrix is usually designed in the null
space of channel matrix Hj . We may called it precoding
selection space as well. Obviously, the smaller the rank of
matrix Hj is, the larger the dimension of its corresponding
precoding selection space will be. In return, the design of
the corresponding precoder has more freedom and the secrecy
performance will be better. Therefore we define the dimension
of the precoding selection space as the security degrees of
freedom (SDF).
A. Design of Precoders for Bobs Based on ISDF
In the existing schemes e.g., the SVD method, ZF beam-
forming method and BD method, the precoder is designed
based on their corresponding user’s own channel matrix or
the other users’ channel matrices, which means the SDF will
be largely limited by the rank of their corresponding channel
matrices and the performance will be inevitably affected. To
solve this problem, here we propose a new method, which are
4designed based on the previously designed precoders instead.
Because the new method can directly increase the SDF when
designing each precoder, we just name it as the increasing
security degree of freedom (ISDF) method. This method is
similar to the idea of DPC method [23] in some sense. For
example, Alice first picks a precoder for Bob 1 and then
chooses a precoder for Bob 2 with full (noncausal) knowledge
of the precoder for Bob 1. Therefore, Bob 1 does not see
the signal intended for Bob 2 as interference. Similarly, the
precoder for Bob 3 is chosen such that Bob 1 and Bob 2 do
not see the signals intended for Bob 3 as interference. This
process continues for all Bobs. Bob J subsequently sees the
signals intended for all other users as interference, Bob 2 sees
the signals intended for Bob 1 as interference, etc.
Suppose that the J Bobs has been sorted as Bob 1, Bob
2, . . ., Bob J according to some criterion, which will be
discussed in the simulation section. We first design W1 for
Bob 1 without loss of generality.
W1 ∝ max d1 eigenvectors of (H
H
1 H1), (8)
where Eq. (8) means that W1 is composed by the d1 eigen-
vectors corresponding to the largest d1 eigenvalues of H
H
1 H1,
1 ≤ d1 ≤ NB1.
Then the following precoders are designed to satisfy an
basic condition that each of them must be located in the null
space of all previously designed precoders.
W2 ⊂ ker(W1),
W3 ⊂ ker(W1)
⋂
ker(W2),
...
Wj ⊂
⋂
i=1,i<j
ker(Wi),
...
WJ ⊂
J−1⋂
i=1
ker(Wi),
(9)
where ker(·) denotes the null space (the kernel) of some
matrix, and ∩ represents the intersection of subspaces. Here,
we define the co-designed-precoders matrix for the Bob j as
W˜j = [W1,W2, . . . ,Wj−1]. (10)
From Eq. (9), we know that the design of each precoder should
satisfy WTj W˜j = [0, · · · , 0].
Let Lj be the dimension of ker(W˜j). Then the precoder
Wj can be composed by
Wj = Tnull,jTstream,j , (11)
where Tnull,j is used to suppress the interference, which is
an NA × Lj matrix. Tstream,j is an Lj × dj matrix used
for streams selection, which can make better use of the space
resource and therefore improve the capacity.
Note that the precoding matrix Wj should be a nonzero
matrix, otherwise, no signal is transmitted. To guarantee the
existence of a nonzero precoding matrix, a sufficient condition
is that the number of the transmit antennas is larger than the
previous j − 1 users’ total data streams, i.e.,
NA > max
j=1,2,...,J
J−1∑
i=1
di. (12)
Under this sufficient condition, let {t1j , t
2
j , . . . , t
Lj
j } be an
orthnormal basis of the subspace ker(W˜j). Then the kernel
space is spanned by the generator T
(0)
j = [t
1
j , t
2
j , . . . , t
Lj
j ].
Then Eq. (9) can be rewritten as
W2 ⊂ spanT
(0)
2 = ker(W1) = ker(W˜2),
W3 ⊂ spanT
(0)
3 = ker(W1)
⋂
ker(W2) = ker(W˜3),
...
Wj ⊂ spanT
(0)
j =
⋂
i=1,i<j
ker(Wi) = ker(W˜j),
...
WJ ⊂ spanT
(0)
J =
J−1⋂
i=1
ker(WJ) = ker(W˜J),
(13)
where the generator matrix T
(0)
j can be computed through
singular value decomposition (SVD) [25] as
W˜j =
[
T
(1)
j T
(0)
j
] [
ΣW 0
0 0
] [
R
(1)
j
R
(0)
j
]
, (14)
where ΣW is a diagonal matrix whose diagonal entries are in
descending order. Then we can get Tnull,j = T
(0)
j , which is
an NA × Lj matrix.
As for Tstream,j whose role is to linearly combine the Lj
orthnomral basis to compose a precoder with dj columns,
it therefore can make better use of the space resource. The
design of Tstream,j can be achieved by applying SVD to the
equivalent channel matrix H˜j = HjTnull,j ,
H˜Tj =
[
T˜
(1)
j T˜
(0)
j
] [ ΣH 0
0 0
] [
R˜
(1)
j
R˜
(0)
j
]
, (15)
where ΣH is a diagonal matrix whose diagonal entries are in
descending order. Then we get Tstream,j = T˜
(1)
j , which is an
Lj × dj matrix. Then Eq. (11) can be rewritten as:
Wj = T
(0)
j T˜
(1)
j . (16)
The dimension of Wj is dj ≤ Lj . If dj = 1, there is a
single data stream sent to Bob j, and Tstream,j contains the
singular vector corresponding to the largest singular value, i.e.,
the data stream is transmitted through the equivalent channel
with the largest singular value. So does for 1 < dj < Lj . If
dj = Lj , the data streams will be transmitted through all the
sub-channels with non-zero singular value. In order to simplify
the analysis, we assume that the power are uniformly allocated
for the message of user j. The secrecy rate can be further
increased if Water-Filling (WF) method is used, which will be
discussed in section IV.
Obviously, we can get the SDF for each method as follow-
ing:
SDFj,ISDF = the dimension of ∩
j−1
ℓ=1 ker(Wℓ),
SDFj,BD = the dimension of ∩ℓ 6=j ker(Hℓ),
SDFj,ZF = the dimension of ∩ℓ 6=j ker(Hℓ),
SDFj,SV D = the dimension of ker(Hj).
(17)
Since the dimension of ker(Wℓ) is usually greater than that of
∩ℓ 6=j ker(Hℓ), and the intersection operation in ISDF scheme
5takes less terms than that of BD and ZF schems, we have the
SDF of the ISDF scheme is usually greater than those of the
BD and ZF-beamforming schemes. But the SDF of the ISDF
scheme may not be greater than that of the SVD scheme. Since
the SVD method can not well cancel the CCI, the secrecy
performance of ISDF scheme outperforms that of the SVD
scheme, which will be verified by the simulation results.
B. Precoder Design for Eves Based on ISDF
Since the CSI of all receivers (except for the eavesdroppers)
is available at the transmitter, in order to guarantee that it does
not impact the desired receivers, the artificial noise is often
mapped into the subspace orthogonal to the effective downlink
co-channel matrix Hˆ [11][17], where
Hˆ = [HT1 ,H
T
2 , . . . ,H
T
J ]. (18)
Then we can get the precoder W ⊂ ker(Hˆ), i.e., the kernel
of Hˆ. Note that the precoding matrix W should also be a
nonzero matrix. To guarantee the existence of a nonzero power
of artificial noise, a sufficient condition is that the number of
the transmit antennas is larger than the rank of matrix Hˆ.
Because the practical channel matrix is usually assumed to
be full-rank, NA must satisfies NA >
∑J
j=1NBj , which is a
very tight constraint.
However, we actually don’t have to make W orthogonal to
each user’s channel matrix Hj . We can achieve the goal by
transmitting the artificial noise into the null space of all users’
precoder matrices instead. Define the effective co-precoder
matrix as
Wˆ = [W1,W2, . . . ,WJ ]. (19)
To transmit the artificial noise more effectively, it may be
mapped into the subspace orthogonal to the effective co-
precoder matrix Wˆ. Then we can get W ⊂ ker(Wˆ), i.e.,
W lies in the null space of Wˆ. Because inequality dj ≤ NBj
is always valid, the rank of Wˆ is usually smaller than that of
Hˆ. Therefore, we have more freedom to transmit the artificial
noise, and the constraint on NA can therefore be relaxed as
NA >
∑J
i=1 dj .
To distinguish the two schemes of transmitting artificial
noise, we category them as the ISDF1 scheme and the ISDF2
scheme. If the noise is mapped into the subspace orthogonal
to the effective downlink co-channel matrix Hˆ, it is called
ISDF1; if If the noise is mapped into the subspace orthogonal
to the effective co-precoder matrix Wˆ, it is called ISDF2. In
the simulation section, we will compare the two schemes.
C. The analysis of complexity
In this section, we will make a discussion on the com-
putational complexity of the proposed approach versus the
other threes methods. As introduced in section II, The SVD
method and ZF beamforming method are simple, but of
little ideal performance. The BD method get somewhat better
performance on secrecy rate, but its computational complexity
becomes higher compared with the former.
Then, the emphasis is the comparison of complexity be-
tween the proposed ISDF method and the BD method. Es-
sentially, the main difference between the ISDF and BD
method lies on solving the precoding selection matrix (PSM).
In the ISDF method, the PSM is obtained by implement-
ing an SVD decomposition on the previously designed
precoders W˜j , which is a NA ×
∑j−1
n=1 dn matrix. The
complexity of this SVD decomposition is O((
∑j−1
n=1 dn)
3).
While the PSM in the BD method is obtained by an
SVD decomposition on all others’ channel matrixes H˜j ,
where H˜j = [H
T
1 ,H
T
2 , . . . ,H
T
j−1,H
T
j+1, . . . ,H
T
J ], which
is a NA ×
∑
n6=j NBn matrix. And the complexity of this
SVD decomposition is O((
∑
n6=j NBn)
3), which is higher
than the former. Since both of the two methods have J
precoders to design, there are J PSMs need to be solven
accordingly. Therefore, the complexity of the ISDF method
is O(
∑J
j=1(
∑j−1
n=1 dn)
3), on the other hand, that of the BD
method is O(
∑J
j=1(
∑
n6=j NBn)
3). Obviously, the complexity
of the our proposed approach is lower.
IV. THE SECRECY RATE OF MUME-MIMO SYSTEM
In this section, we will analyze the secrecy rate of ISDF1
and ISDF2. Suppose that the variance of the transmit symbol
vector uj is σ
2
uj , and the complex Gaussian random elements
of v are i.i.d whose variance is σ2v . It is assumed that Alice
has a total amount of transmit power budget P . Due to the
normalization of the noise variance at Bob, we can also refer to
P as the transmission SNR. One important parameter should
be designed is the power ratio, denoted by ρj (0 < ρj < 1),
allocated for the user j’s information transmission. We define
the power ratio for transmitting artificial noise as α (0 < α <
1). Let
Qj , E(uju
H
j ), Qv , E(vv
H ). (20)
Then we have
tr(Qj) = Pj = ρjP, tr(Qv) = αP, (21)
and
P =
J∑
j=1
ρjP+αP =
J∑
j=1
djσ
2
uj +
NA − J∑
j=1
dj
σ2v , (22)
in which, we have used the following facts
α = 1−
J∑
j=1
ρj,
NA ≥
J∑
j=1
dj + 1,
σ2uj =
Pj
dj
=
ρjP
dj
,
σ2v =
(1−
∑J
j=1 ρj)P
NA −
∑J
j=1 dj
.
(23)
6In order to analyze the secrecy rate concisely, Eq. (7) can
be rewritten as:
Yj = Hj
J∑
i=1
Wiui +HjWv+N
B
j
= HjWjuj +Hj
J∑
i=1,i6=j
Wiui +HjWv +N
B
j
= Ĥjjuj +
J∑
i=1,i6=j
Ĥji + Ĥjv +N
B
j
Zk = Gk
K∑
ℓ=1
Wℓuℓ +GkWv+N
E
k
= GkWℓuℓ +Gk
J∑
ℓ=1,ℓ 6=j
Wℓuℓ +GkWv +N
E
k
= Ĝkkuk +
J∑
ℓ=1,ℓ 6=j
Ĝkℓ + Ĝkv +N
E
k
(24)
where we have defined
Ĥji , HjWi, Ĥj , HjW, (25)
Ĝkℓ , GkWℓ, Ĝk , GkW, (26)
for j, i, ℓ = 1, 2, . . . , J, k = 1, 2, . . . ,K .
The secrecy rate is the maximum transmission rate at which
the intended receiver can decode the data with arbitrarily small
error, which is bounded by the difference in the capacity
between Alice and Bob and that between Alice and Eve [2].
In the following part, the secrecy rate will be given in terms
of secrecy sum rate [13] and absolute secrecy rate, where the
secrecy sum rate is noted by Rssr and the absolute secrecy
rate is noted by Rasr.
A. The secrecy rate of ISDF1
As in [11], we can normalize the distance of each Bob to
make the variance of the elements ofHj equal to unity without
loss of generality, and the noise vector NBj is of unit variance.
Since the artificial noise is transmitted in the null space of
all legitimate users’ matrixes, it will be nulled in any user’s
received signal. Then the capacity between Alice and Bob j
is
RBj = EĤ
log2
∣∣∣∣∣∣ I+ σ2ujĤjjĤHjj
(
I+
J∑
i6=j
σ2uiĤjiĤ
H
ji
)−1∣∣∣∣∣∣

= E
Ĥ
log2
∣∣∣∣∣∣ I+ ρjPdj ĤjjĤHjj
(
I+
J∑
i6=j
ρiP
di
ĤjiĤ
H
ji
)−1∣∣∣∣∣∣
 ,
(27)
where we used the fact Ĥj = 0.
Next, we study the capacity between Alice and the multiple
colluding or non-concluding Eves. When multiple Eves are
allocated at different places, the noise at each Eve may be
different. In addition, the receiver noise levels at Eves may
not be known by Alice or Bobs. To guarantee secure commu-
nication, it is therefore reasonable to consider the worst-case
scenario where the noises at Eves are arbitrarily small. Note
that this approach has been also taken in [9] and [11]. In this
case, the noiseless eavesdropper assumption gives an upper
bound on the rate between Alice’s message for the user j and
the eavesdropper k as
REjk =EĤ,Gk
{
log2
∣∣∣∣I+ σ2ujĜkjĜHkj( J∑
ℓ=1,ℓ 6=j
σ2uℓĜkℓĜ
H
kℓ
+σ2vĜkĜ
H
k
)−1∣∣∣∣}
=E
Ĥ,Gk
{
log2
∣∣∣∣I+ ρjPdj ĜkjĜHkj
( J∑
ℓ=1,ℓ 6=j
ρℓP
dℓ
ĜkℓĜ
H
kℓ
+
αP
NA −
∑J
i=1NBi
ĜkĜ
H
k
)−1∣∣∣∣}.
(28)
After deriving the expressions of RBj and R
E
kj , the ergodic
secrecy rate can now be obtained as Rjk = [R
B
j −R
E
jk]
+.
1) Secrecy Sum-Rate : As proposed in [13], the secrecy
rate for Bob j is
Rjse = min
1≤k≤K,
{Rjk}.
Then the secrecy sum rate is
Rssr =
J∑
j=1
Rjse =
J∑
j=1
min
1≤k≤K,
{Rjk}.
=
J∑
j=1
min
k
E
Ĥ,Gk
{[
log2
∣∣∣∣I+ ρjPdj ĤjjĤHjj(
I+
J∑
i6=j
ρiP
di
ĤjiĤ
H
ji
)−1∣∣∣∣
− log2
∣∣∣∣I+ ρjPdj ĜkjĜHkj
( J∑
ℓ=1,ℓ 6=j
ρℓP
dℓ
ĜkℓĜ
H
kℓ
+
αP
NA −
∑J
i=1NBi
ĜkĜ
H
k
)−1∣∣∣∣
]+}
.
(29)
2) Absolute secrecy rate : As we have discussed, for the
broadcast MUME-MIMO wiretap system, the absolute secrecy
capacity is the lower bound of the ergodic secrecy rate, which
is given by
Rasr = min
1≤j≤J,1≤k≤K
{Rjk} = min
j,k
E
Ĥ,Gk
{[
log2
∣∣∣∣I+ ρjPdj ĤjjĤHjj
(
I+
J∑
i6=j
ρiP
di
ĤjiĤ
H
ji
)−1∣∣∣∣
− log2
∣∣∣∣I+ ρjPdj ĜkjĜHkj
( J∑
ℓ=1,ℓ 6=j
ρℓP
dℓ
ĜkℓĜ
H
kℓ
+
αP
NA −
∑J
i=1NBi
ĜkĜ
H
k
)−1∣∣∣∣
]+}
.
(30)
7B. The secrecy rate of ISDF2
In the ISDF2 method, the rate between Alice and Bob j is
RBj = EĤ
{
log2
∣∣∣∣ I+ σ2ujĤjjĤHjj(I+ J∑
i6=j
σ2uiĤjiĤ
H
ji
+ σ2vĤjĤ
H
j
)−1∣∣∣∣}
= E
Ĥ
{
log2
∣∣∣∣ I+ ρjPdj ĤjjĤHjj
(
I+
J∑
i6=j
ρiP
di
ĤjiĤ
H
ji
+
αP
NA −
∑J
i=1 di
ĤjĤ
H
j
)−1∣∣∣∣}.
(31)
Similar to Eq. (28), the rate between Alice’s message for the
user j and the eavesdropper k can be rewritten as:
REkj =EĤ,Gk
{
log2
∣∣∣∣I+ σ2ujĜkjĜHkj( J∑
ℓ=1,ℓ 6=j
σ2uℓĜkℓĜ
H
kℓ
+σ2vĜkĜ
H
k
)−1∣∣∣∣}
=E
Ĥ,Gk
{
log2
∣∣∣∣I+ ρjPdj ĜkjĜHkj
( J∑
ℓ=1,ℓ 6=j
ρℓP
dℓ
ĜkℓĜ
H
kℓ
+
αP
NA −
∑J
i=1 di
ĜkĜ
H
k
)−1∣∣∣∣}.
(32)
1) Secrecy Sum-Rate : Accordingly, the secrecy sum-rate
is
Rssr =
J∑
j=1
Rjse =
J∑
j=1
min
1≤k≤K,
{Rjk}.
=
J∑
j=1
min
k
E
Ĥ,Gk
{[
log2
∣∣∣∣I+ ρjPdj ĤjjĤHjj(
I+
J∑
i6=j
ρiP
di
ĤjiĤ
H
ji +
αP
NA −
∑J
i=1 di
ĜkĜ
H
k
)−1∣∣∣∣
− log2
∣∣∣∣I+ ρjPdj ĜkjĜHkj
( J∑
ℓ=1,ℓ 6=j
ρℓP
dℓ
ĜkℓĜ
H
kℓ
+
αP
NA −
∑J
i=1 di
ĜkĜ
H
k
)−1∣∣∣∣
]+}
.
(33)
2) Absolute secrecy rate: we can also get the lower bound
of ergodic secrecy rate for ISDF2 method,
Rasr = min
1≤j≤J,1≤k≤K
E
Ĥ,Gk
{[
log2
∣∣∣∣I+ ρjPdj ĤjjĤHjj(
I+
J∑
i6=j
ρiP
di
ĤjiĤ
H
ji +
αP
NA −
∑J
i=1 di
ĜkĜ
H
k
)−1∣∣∣∣
− log2
∣∣∣∣I+ ρjPdj ĜkjĜHkj
( J∑
ℓ=1,ℓ 6=j
ρℓP
dℓ
ĜkℓĜ
H
kℓ
+
αP
NA −
∑J
i=1 di
ĜkĜ
H
k
)−1∣∣∣∣
]+}
.
(34)
C. The secrecy rate of ISDF1 with Water Filling method
This section focuses on improving the secrecy rate with
water-filling method based on ISDF1 method introduced in
section III. As mentioned in section III-A, when the users
have multiple antennas and dj (dj > 1) data streams are
transmitted to user j simultaneously, the water-filling method
may be employed together with ISDF1 to further improved
the performance of achievable secrecy rate. Our goal is to
implement single-user water-filling on each legitimate user to
maximize their rate under the given power ratio constraint.
The single-user optimization problem has a well-known
water-filling solution. The water-filling algorithm takes ad-
vantage of the problem structure by decomposing the channel
into orthogonal modes, which greatly reduces the optimization
complexity. Here, without loss of generality, we just take user
j for example with the constraint of the given total power
(ρjP ). As derived in Eq. (24), the signal received at user j
can be written as:
Yj = Ĥjjuj +Kj (35)
where Kj =
∑J
i=1,i6=j Ĥjiui+ Ĥjv+N
B
j is the interference
towards user j from the message signal transmitted to other
users. We first implement an Whiting processing on the
interference vector Kj in Eq. (35), before conducting the
water-filling algorithm. Let M = E(KjK
H
j ), which unitary
decomposition is M = EΛEH . The we can whiten Kj by
Λ−1/2EHYj = Λ
−1/2EHĤjjuj + Λ
−1/2EHKj . (36)
Then the corresponding mutual information rate RBj is
RBj = EĤ
{
log2
∣∣∣∣ I+ σ2ujΛ−1/2EHĤjjĤHjjEΛ−1/2∣∣∣∣}.
(37)
Suppose that RBjn is the rate from the n-th subcarrier to
Bob j, and hjn the corresponding effective sub-channel after
whitening and orthgononalizing. Since only dj streams are
transmitted to user j, the optimal problem on the dynamic
power allocation aiming to maximize the rate RBj between
transmitter and user j can be expressed as following:
8R∗j = max
dj∑
n=1
log2
(
1 + Pjnhjn
)
,
s.t.
dj∑
n=1
Pjn ≤ Pj = ρjP, and Pjn > 0, ∀n,
(38)
where Pjn denotes the power allocated for the n-th subcarrier
of user j. Based on Eq. (38), we use the classical Lagrange
algorithm to construct an Lagrange function,
L =
dj∑
n=1
log2 (1 + Pjnhjn)− λ
 dj∑
n=1
Pjn − ρjP
 .
(39)
Let
∂L
∂Pjn
=
1
ln 2
hjn
1 + hjnPjn
− λ = 0,
and β = λ ln 2. Then we can obtain
β =
hjn
1 + Pjnhjn
, Pjn =
[
1
β
−
1
hjn
]+
.
Then solving the optimal problem depends on the computa-
tion of β and Pjn. The paper [26] put forward a fast iterative
algorithm, which give the preliminary value of β and its update
method. That is
β0 =
1
dj
(∣∣Pj + dj∑
n=1
1
hjn
∣∣), (40)
βℓ = βℓ−1 +
1
dj
(∣∣Pj + dj∑
n=1
Pjn
∣∣). (41)
In this paper, we will employ this fast iterative algorithm to
perform simulations.
V. SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section, we will carry out some simulations to show
the achievable secrecy rate. In all simulations, the entries of
all channel matrices are assumed to be independent, zero-
mean Gaussian random variables with unit variance. All results
are based on an average of 1000 independent trials. The
background noise power is the same for all Bobs with a
variance I. To guarantee the secure communication, it is
therefore reasonable to consider the worst case scenario, where
the noises variance at Eves are arbitrarily small (approaching
zero). The desired rate for Bobs and Eves will be measured
by the ergodic capacity rather than the outage capacity.
A. Secrecy Rate and Power Efficiency
Fig. 2, Fig. 3 and Fig. 4, are corresponding to the cases
dj = 1, which exhibits the comparison of secrecy rate and
information power ratio for information signal among the 5
methods. Fig. 2 and Fig. 3 demonstrate that that the ISDF1
method offers the best performance compared with the other
methods, in term of secrecy sum rate and absolute secrecy
rate respectively. From Fig. 2 and Fig. 3, we can see that
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Fig. 2: Comparison of secrecy sum rate for the five methods
when J = 3, K = 2, dj = 1, NBj = 3, NEk = 4.
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Fig. 3: Comparison of absolute secrecy rate for the five
methods when J = 3, K = 2, dj = 1, NA = 10, NBj = 3,
NEk = 4.
ISDF2 performs best in the low SNR region but performs
worse in the high SNR region. This is because that at the
high SNR region, the artificial noise is not well canceled at
receive terminal by using the null space of the co-precoder
matrix to design W. Since ISF1 uses the nulll space of the
co-channel matrix to desing W, which can well cancel the
artificial noise. From Fig. 4, we can see that both ISDF1 and
ISDF2 methods have less power efficiency (information power
over total power) than the ZF Beamforming method. While in
secure communications, the secrecy rate is the major concern.
Therefore the ISDF scheme provides a good candidate for
secure communications.
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Fig. 4: Comparison of information power ratio for the five
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Fig. 5: The absolute secrecy rate of ISDF1 for Eves’
colluding (K = 1) and non-colluding (K = 2) scenarios
when J = 3, dj = 1, NA = 10, NBj = 3.
B. Secrecy Rate and Power Efficiency for Eves’ Colluding and
Non-Colluding
Fig. 5 and Fig. 6 show the absolute secrecy rate and
information power ratio of ISDF1 for the Eves’ colluding
and non-colluding scenarios. If the Eves choose to wiretap
the message jointly, we may think they are colluding, else
non-colluding. As shown in Fig. 5, it will be more difficult to
achieve secure communication if the Eves choose to cooperate,
which is as we expected. We are interesting in whether we
need to allocate more power to transmit information signal
or artificial noise when the Eves choose to cooperate. Fig. 6
shows that more power needs to be allocated to artificial noise
if Eves choose to cooperate. So does the case with more
Eves. These demonstrate that when power has been optimized
already and the eavesdroppers’ condition is getting better,
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the power allocating towards artificial noise can make more
contribution for the secrecy rate than allocating towards users’
information signal.
C. Power Ratio for different Ordering and Power Allocation
As mentioned in section III-A, since the ordering of the
users will affect the performance, we wish to study how the
power is allocated between the information signal and the
artificial noise for giving different user priority of precoding.
Fig. 7 illustrates that the the system performs better in term
of absolute secrecy capacity when we give the user with least
antennas or largest noise variance the priority of precoding.
This is because that the absolute secrecy capacity is mainly
determined by the poorest-performance receive-wiretap pair to
a large extent. In order to get a large secrecy rate, we should
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Fig. 8: Comparison of absolute secrecy rate for ISDF method
and ISDF method with WF when J = 3, K = 2, NA = 10,
J = 3, NEk = 4, NB1 = NB2 = NB3 = NB .
make the secrecy rate for each user equivalently. Therefor
should give the weaker user (less antennas or larger noise)
more SDF by rendering them the priority of precoding. Fig. 8
shows that the secrecy capacity can be further increased as
introduced in IV-C, if the water-filling (WF) algorithm is used.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
This paper proposes the precoding strategy based on the
ISDF method for providing secure communication at the
physical layer in broadcast MUME-MIMO wiretap channels
combined with artificial noise. We derive both the secrecy
sum rate and absolute secrecy rate for the proposed ISDF1
and ISDF2 method. Simulations show that the ISDF2 perform
best in low SNR region and ISDF1 outperforms other four
methods in high SNR region in terms of achievable secrecy
rate. Furthermore, we find that more power should be allocated
to artificial noise instead of information signal when the
eavesdroppers’ condition is better than the intended users, and
we should first precode the user with bad condition (least
antennas or largest noise variance).
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